Contra the last (probably).

It seemed polite to include a picture of John.

It seems only fitting that I present a right of reply of my very own. I’m not going to apologise for this, frankly, if you’re still reading this exchange then you have no one to blame but yourself.

As for John’s reply, I think there are a few points of agreement:

• It is unlikely that we can reconcile our different perspectives on why Libya is not like Iraq or Afghanistan (or why it is, for John), or on whether it’s prudent to wait for more atrocities to occur or to act pre-emptively and cut them short before they reach a massed scale. I’ll touch on this below.
• I accept that a no-fly zone does require the elimination of anti-aircraft deployments, most likely via ground operations.  It is probable that the rebels will not be able to perform such operations without assistance from any American led coalition/NATO personnel.
• Neither of us are particularly qualified to be commenting on Libya and it would likely be better for everyone if we stuck to pointless cultural observations and our thoughts on tax.

I would point anyone interested in this topic to an interview with General Wesley Clarke (hat tip to Gene) and his thoughts on what needs to happen before a no-fly zone is enacted. I don’t agree with everything he says but, given he is a four star general, I can understand why anyone would appreciate his thoughts over mine.

The two most important points Clarke makes relate to the significance of designing a clear objective, something I agreed with in my piece (although Clarke would probably not agree with my stated objective), and his second, which I didn’t touch on, is the importance of confirming any claims of human rights abuse before proceeding to intervene in Libya. As an aside, I note that many of those against the no-fly zone think it is somehow threatening to Gaddafi and his henchmen that ‘one day’, they might be brought to justice at the International Criminal Court - a powerful deterrent against human rights abuse (which this statement implicitly accepts is happening) to be sure.

On the issue of the objective – the goal is not just to prevent Gaddafi from bombing the protestors from above. If the reports of foreign mercenaries being flown in to to kill civilians and rebels are true (the confirmation of which, relates to the second point of the need to confirm such claims) then this is outrageous and unconscionable behaviour which must be stopped. I note Clarke didn’t touch on the issue of mercenaries but the interview was from three days ago and the facts still remain admittedly hazy.

Clarke then raises the concept of the ‘slippery slope’ argument, also implied by John, that blocking Gaddafi’s air power might lead him to escalate his ground personnel (more tanks etc.) and that as a result, an American led coalition or NATO will have no choice but to respond in kind.

I see no reason why Gaddafi would not already be deploying his forces in a maximum capacity, in combination with his fighter jets – he already has every incentive to launch every weapon in his arsenal (everybody prays that this doesn’t include chemical weapons), as hesitation will only bring him closer to defeat. The only reason I can think as to why tank attacks have been somewhat sporadic to date is that many Libyan soldiers share similar sentiments to the heroic pilots, who, on being told to bomb protestors, flew to Malta instead and sought asylum (If only my tank could fly, commanders must be thinking). The thirteen soldiers who were burned alive for refusing to fire on civilians in Benghazi (found alongside 67 other mutilated bodies), suggests this is more than plausible.

As far as the potential tit for tat escalation between Gaddafi and allied forces is concerned, this is a possibility – but one that I think can be avoided if it is stated from the very outset that assistance will be limited to air support for the rebels and no more. Gaddafi is going to lose this fight with the rebels, the question is how long it will take and how many lives he will take with him. John speaks of the ‘puke’ test – seemingly indicating many more innocents need to die before a no-fly zone is justified. A no-fly zone implemented sooner rather than later, will save the lives of many pro-democracy supporters.

Again, there are perfectly valid reasons for not supporting any military assistance in Libya – the challenge of international legitimacy is not insignificant, with the difficulty of obtaining a resolution from the Security Council being the primary obstacle.   But given the Arab League supports a no-fly zone and that there are (some) rebels calling for a no fly-zone, I’m still inclined to think it is an option worth supporting and worth putting one’s name to.

Finally, I should note that I don’t agree with Hitchens implicit desire for America to act on this alone (I would hope for NATO or NATO-lite) or his his seeming lack of concern (by omission) for whether they should at least wait for the fig-leaf of an invitation from Libyan rebels (I think they should).