Contra Fowler – why we should support a no-fly zone in Libya.

The symbol of the Libyan revolution - Libya's flag prior to Gaddafi.

In which I disagree with John’s latest post

A thought experiment: If Col. Gaddafi was informed that a few thousand protestors had gathered in Tripoli’s ‘Green Square’, would he a) resign immediately b) hope they’d eventually move along as ‘there was nothing to see’ c) shoot them all.

If the answer is c) and we can do something about it, should we?

Although the hypothetical nature of this multiple-choice arrangement absolves one from having to deliver an answer, it is worth noting that the reason it is a hypothetical is that Gaddafi’s brutal henchmen are murdering anyone with a potential whiff of a revolutionary air, well before they’ve suffered their way through the Tripolitanian streets that lead to the city’s centre.

There are a number of philosophically consistent reasons as to why the West (led by the US) should not provide military assistance to the Libyan uprising, yet none of them are synonymous with the fundamental values of social liberalism and it is this hypocritical equivocation, I think, from (otherwise) champions of the social democratic movement, to which Hitchens objects and John – unintentionally (I assume) – lends his support.  Take the following statement from Obama in 2009, in Cairo no less:

“America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for … human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere…. There is no straight line to realize this promise…And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments – provided they govern with respect for all their people”

This on the back of an earlier passage:

“Words alone cannot meet the needs of our people. These needs will be met only if we act boldly in the years ahead; and if we understand that the challenges we face are shared, and our failure to meet them will hurt us all”

Gaddafi is governing with utter disrespect for his people and he has contravened the human rights of millions – it is time for Obama to act boldly and to seek the implementation of a no-fly zone.

It is interesting that John references Reagan’s famous conversation with a wall in 1987 as similarly influential to Obama’s response to revolution in North Africa; there is, I agree, a continuity, but only in so far as neither President really has/had any idea how rapidly the veil of autocracy can slip before them, completely unaffected by their patently empty rhetoric. Chris Matthews on MSNBC’s hardball, a station for Democratic blowhards, also happily laid the first planks of an eerie Reagan-like revisionism when he declared of the Tahrir revolution: “it took Obama to have this happen, or it’s just so serendipitous.’ Much more of the latter, than the former, I should think.

The reasons against military assistance are, despite John’s claims to the contrary, wholly based in the principles of utilitarianism and realpolitik (one could reasonably highlight pacifism as a factor but I don’t think it applies in this scenario). This is not inherently immoral – unless one is a moral absolutist – but when there is blood on the streets and you can do something about it, one cannot be both a utilitarian and a social liberal.

Before I delve into the arguments surrounding liberalism, I’d like to object to the myth that the American administration and its diplomats (and the rest of the world, for that matter) are on top of the seething uprisings throughout the Middle East. If US diplomats are genuinely all over this situation, then why the nine-day time lapse between the initial Libyan uprising on February 15th and the evacuation of American diplomatic corps on February 24?  The NY times details some of the reasons here – but the excuses seem to confirm that the Americans are scrambling to keep up with the revolution as much as the Libyan protestors, Gaddafi, and, well, everybody else. This alone runs counter to John’s suggestion that Obama’s “Inaction, crossed wires, conflicting statements and apparent confusion…has been a co-ordinated response” to disguise which horse America is backing. And, even if that is the case  - however unlikely – the idea that America the hegemon should be afraid of showing even rhetorical support for democracy anywhere in the world leaves a somewhat bitter taste in my mouth (similar to Swiss cheese, I should think).

Back to the utilitarianism v liberalism distinction: on the ideal desirability of an organic revolution I agree with John. Where I differ is in the idea that America and any willing allies should be cowed by a faulty cost-benefit analysis into retreating into the shadows and waiting for a Libyan bloodbath to unfold, gambling democracy will win in the end (and if it doesn’t, at least America’s strategic regional interests are unchanged). This is the essence of Nixon-Kissinger realpolitik – an attitude that Woodrow Wilson would deplore.  I agree that the choice is not so stark as ‘intervention = moral good’, ‘non-intervention = moral bad’.  Clearly any military operation against Gaddafi’s loyalists is tantamount to a declaration of war and supporting a no-fly zone via the use of the US air force demands an honest acceptance of this reality.   In the words of Clausewitz, ‘War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”  War should be a last resort, but a war is already happening in Libya, and international assistance can greatly alleviate the level of suffering.  A conservatively minded utilitarian has every right to be cautious over Libya and probably should be, but a true social liberal who has the power to assist the powerless and the knowledge that they have extremely good prospects of success, cannot sit idly by while a mass killing is on the cards.

However, even if we are to go down the cost-benefit route, I still think the calculus provides a different answer to that suggested by John. Not all military engagements are homogenous in their parameters and the call for a no-fly zone thankfully demands a specific and limited objective, with none of the long-term demands that arise from sending in ground forces such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here, assistance to the Libyan people is provided simply through liberation of the skies, and the provision of freedom to Libyan civilians from marauding murderous mercenaries who are flying in from places such as Nigeria, Guinea, Mali and Serbia with the promise of up to $2500 a day for the service of blowing the brains out of Gaddafi’s Libyan brothers and sisters.

The clarity of the Libyan objective is also why I disagree with the use of Afghanistan and Iraq as direct comparisons.  The strategic tragedy of ‘operation Iraqi freedom’ was the incongruity between the initial mission objectives and the aftermath and in Afghanistan, an inability to cope with the geographical terrain (and the Pakistani border). As Vizzini the Sicilian in the Princess Bride would tell us, Afghanistan demonstrates that most classic of blunders – ‘never get involved in a land war in Asia’. Of course, that George W. Bush’s ‘mission accomplished’ declaration was technically accurate in the strategic sense is not particularly comforting to the families of dead soldiers and Iraqi civilians (the army was told to oust Saddam Hussein from power and that they undeniably did). But it doesn’t take a genius to predict the extreme difficulty of winning the favour of a local population, under your occupation, when you’ve blown up their electricity and water grids, as well as decommissioned their entire police force and wider legal system. This is why the Iraq and Afghanistan missions have proved to be such huge disappointments to liberal interventionists – Hitchens included – the ineptitude of the army’s political masters to devise an appropriate set of objectives for dealing with conditions on the ground after the initial liberation was particularly galling for those who believe in humanitarian intervention.

On this count, the terrible cost in ‘blood and treasure’ to the United States, members of UNAMA and the coalition of the willing in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, not to mention civilian casualties, is reason enough to make even the most hawkish of observers think twice about embroiling American troops in another middle eastern/north African conflict.

But Libya is different.  Firstly, this conflict did not begin because of the West. Secondly, there is little reason to believe that provision of air support will lead to total ownership of the political outcome – that air support is for a wholly homegrown Libyan rebellion that is only too happy to control its own future.  Thirdly, Libyans want change and have demonstrably shown they are prepared to seize it on their own, in a way that their counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq did not. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, however, their murderous ruler has not hesitated in revealing his absolute darkest side.  Protestors have had bombs dropped on them from above, have been rounded up and shot while at prayer and have met miserable ends in the back of ambulances hijacked by Gadaffi’s henchmen.  We also know that thousands of refugees are piling up on the Tunisian border, further destabilising that already dilapidated state, and the region.

As I write this, there are reports from Benghazi that certain rebel groups are already calling for foreign assistance.  Undoubtedly, some will not want it. But in the long run, will Libyans really object to our assistance in their hour of need? Is the fear that other Middle Eastern dictators might start producing even more propaganda against the West (than they already do) really worth the price of a stillborn Libyan revolution?  It’s bad enough we’ve dealt with Gaddafi for some forty years while he’s run Libya and his people into the ground.

With international assistance, what might otherwise be a long, bloody and violent struggle for freedom can be significantly curtailed. There’s evidence enough that the help of America and willing allies is wanted, we know we can give it and we know that more will die if we don’t.

So on this issue John, I respectfully disagree.